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Fisheries have become characterized by declining
total yields and catch rates, conflicts between sectors
and reduced biodiversity (Parfit 1995, Safina 1995). A
classic example is found in the bio-economic collapse
of the northern cod fishery in Atlantic Canada (Walters
and Maguire 1996). For all the stocks worldwide for
which data are available, 70% of these are fully or
overutilized, requiring urgent attention to halt further 
declines (Garcia and Newton 1997). These problems
have led to calls for privatization or stricter regulation
by government authorities, because these are assumed
to be the only workable solutions in respect of resource
use and allocation (Berkes 1986). In this paper, 
co-management is explored as an alternative to stricter
government regulation and centralized management,
because government-imposed regulations are generally
not respected and breaking the law in some fisheries
is common practice (Beddington et al. 1997). The 
argument is that two main factors influence non-
compliance in fishers’ behaviour. First, there is a lack
of understanding among harvesters of the exact con-
sequences of their actions (on the resource and on
other users); second, there is a strong incentive to
catch fish before someone else does. That is, the
rights and rules (i.e. institutions) governing the total
catch of each harvester are inadequate to ensure
long-term sustainability. Against this background, it is
widely thought that the present global crisis in fish-
eries can be attributed to inappropriate institutional
arrangements and a lack of legitimacy of management
regimes (Jentoft 1989).
The legitimacy of regulations and enforcement
could be improved by transferring more responsibility
to user groups by including them in the decision-
making process (Pinkerton 1989a). This belief has
spurred a growing interest in co-management, which
involves agreements between participants in the fishery
and government regulatory agencies. The expanding
wish in South Africa to increase user participation in
management is consistent with this trend (Hutton et
al. 1997, Cochrane and Payne 1998). This interest
has been articulated in the published works of the
Marine Resources Task Group (1997) and Cochrane
et al. (1997), as well as in papers read at the 1996
South African Marine Science Symposium presenting
recent research where the concept has been applied to
local resource management situations (e.g. Beaumont
and Wynberg 1996, Harris et al. 1996, Sowman et al.
1996). The aim of the current paper is to explore the
concept of co-management, to review the experiences
in other jurisdictions and to present a preliminary
analysis of co-management arrangements. The rele-
vance of the concept to fisheries management in
South Africa is discussed along with the challenges
and constraints policy-makers face when considering
user participation in marine resource management.
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CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT POLICY: 
A PERSPECTIVE ON CO-MANAGEMENT AND ITS APPLICATION TO
SOUTH AFRICAN FISHERIES
T. HUTTON*† and T. J. PITCHER†
There is much current interest in fisheries management policy which centres around the introduction of
rights-based management systems, the devolution of control from central regulatory authorities, and the concept
of co-management. In order to address the complexity of the last of these, key principles of co-management
arrangements need to be identified. In the process of establishing these arrangements, rules and rights are 
redefined and new institutions are created for the management of common pool resources, where exclusion
is costly and every resource harvester subtracts value from the harvest of the others. A preliminary analysis of
co-management arrangements is presented that postulates the factors most important for their establishment,
reference being made to the applicability of co-management in South African fisheries. As with other studies
on management of common property resources, it is concluded that the definition of boundaries, both 
resource and human, are critical to the process. In addition, the rules governing participation and the allocation
of costs and benefits need to be mutually agreed upon by all participants, and most importantly well defined,
if successful arrangements are to be established. 
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MANAGING FISHERIES AS NATU-
RAL RESOURCES
Marine fish stocks belong in a category of resources
often referred to as common pool resources1 (see Os-
trom 1990, Pinkerton 1994a), characterized by:
i(i) non-excludability – it is costly to exclude potential
users from access;
(ii) subtractability – each user’s harvest subtracts
from the welfare of others.
In addition, the resources are renewable and part
of complex ecosystems. The fundamental issue is
what institutional arrangements are required for the
sustainable utilization and management of common
pool resources which have these characteristics. The
arrangements must consider the effects of environ-
mental variability and uncertainty, so requiring changes
to the current management systems, because many of
the institutional arrangements for managing fisheries
are inappropriate, as already stated. Traditionally, the
first measures established by government agencies to
regulate fisheries and to achieve biological sustain-
ability and to halt overfishing were “technical”, e.g.
mesh-size limitation. Economic analyses of fisheries
based on some of the early work of Gordon (1954) and
Scott (1955) led to recommendations for government
regulatory authorities to restrict access in order to 
reduce further economic losses in fisheries. In fact,
limiting access by issuing licenses and permits (i.e.
rights to fish) is a method that has been applied 
increasingly by governments of coastal nations to try
to regulate fisheries (see Mollett 1986). The growing
interest in rights-based fisheries-management systems
reached a peak with the introduction of individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) in nations such as New
Zealand (Crothers 1988, Dewees 1989, Annala
1996), Iceland (Arnason 1993, 1996) and Australia
(Pascoe 1993). ITQs give participants market-driven
rights to fish a portion of a given stock.
Many of the rights-based policies implemented to
achieve economic objectives ignore social aspects of
fisheries management, such as the effects on fishing
communities, even though numerous studies have
suggested that the social aspects of fisheries and fisher
behaviour should be considered in the design of
management systems (Wilen 1979, Healey 1985,
Pringle 1985). Neglect of social issues has occurred
despite the recent acquisition of informa-
tion on the social structure of fishing, fish produc-
tion, industry and markets (see for example, Mc-
Goodwin 1990). Furthermore, fundamental to
understanding of resource management is the fact that
people form institutions (rules and rights) around the
shared resources they exploit. Therefore, central to
the arguments for and against rights-based manage-
ment of “common pool resources” and the required
institutions is the concept of “common property”.
Neo-classical economists such as Gordon (1954)
and Hardin (1968) have defined “common property”
as a case where access to the resource is both free and
open, and that in order to achieve sustainability, either
government regulation or privatization is required.
This view is not shared by all, especially those who
make different assumptions with regard to human
collective behaviour. Neo-institutional economic 
analysts such as Ostrom (1990) and Bromley (1991),
elaborating on the earlier work of researchers such as
Acheson (1975), equate “common property” with 
alternative forms of collective management of common
pool resources. Essentially, they argue that “common
property” is property held by a defined group that ex-
cludes others, and that access to the resource is not
free and open (Ciriacy-Wanthrup and Bishops 1975,
as cited in Berkes 1986). In addition, Bromley
(1991) states that such situations represent well-
defined sets of institutional arrangements concerning
who may make use of the resource and also the rules
governing the behaviour of the users.
Some small-scale nearshore fisheries are more
amenable to restricted-access management by local
collectives than those targeting migratory stocks or
offshore stocks distributed over large areas (Anon.
1996). In such circumstances management is outside
the control of the local fishers. However, because
local fishers exploit these resources, they need to be
included in institutional arrangements for their 
management (Berkes 1986). Therefore, when stocks
are distributed over wide areas, there is no reason why
government bodies acting as principle agents cannot
bring competing interests together and include them
in co-operative management arrangements. 
CO-MANAGEMENT
The essence of co-management is that the govern-
ment and the user groups share responsibility for
managing the resource. The user group could be in the
form of a single community fishing a local resource
or an industry organization fishing a stock with a
common gear. Alternatively, in the case of shared 
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1 Ostrom (1990) and Pinkerton (1994a) refer to shared resources
such as fisheries as “common pool resources” in an attempt to
avoid the confusion of terminology between the resource and
the regime (“common property”). This paper follows their dis-
tinction.
resources that are widely dispersed, the government
could enter into multiple agreements with all the 
diverse user groups (be they fishing communities or
fisher organizations) under the umbrella of multiparty
co-management. The process is facilitated if the user
groups are organized and have democratically elected
representatives. In terms of defining the concept, 
co-management in some cases has meant the 
establishment and implementation of joint decision-
making, whereas in others it has simply meant the
creation of advisory boards with no specific decision-
making authority (Paisley et al. 1994). In fact, very
few attempts have been made to systematically 
evaluate co-management experiences (Berkes et al.
1991). Pinkerton (1993, p. 1) defines co-management
where: “The basic principle driving these regimes is
the involvement of fisher’s organisations and fishing
communities in management decision-making through
power sharing: sharing both between government
and locally-based institutions, and among differently-
situated fishers.”
Considering the spectrum of involvement available
to user groups (Fig. 1), some authors define co-
management as situations where management is truly
shared (“cooperative” in Fig. 1). Other researchers
define the term more widely to include practices
where the government either consults extensively
with user groups or, at the other side of the spectrum,
takes an advisory role (Fig. 1). The broader definition
is applied in this paper, but it is accepted that the term
co-management should imply that the user groups
have some degree of power in the form of a definite
influence on the decisions made.
Hersoug and Rånes (1996) argue that co-manage-
ment is often defined too narrowly in terms of its
concentration on resource management only, and that
any arrangements should deal with the whole scope of
basic issues in fisheries management. This includes
sales regulations, subsidies, credit and the development
of infrastructure. Based on this logic, Hersoug and
Rånes (1996) present five “dimensions” of complexity:
(i) the mode of influence (e.g. instructive, consul-
tative, cooperative, etc., as presented in Fig. 1);
(ii) the scope of issues that shared management
covers. (e.g. infrastructure, enforcement);
(iii) timing – the stage of the process at which agree-
ments are fostered (e.g. planning, implementa-
tion, feedback);
(iv) the level of interaction (e.g. national, regional,
local);
(v) the character of representation (with processors,
gear groups, sectors or fishing communities).
The character of representation with regard to the
definition of community is often one of the most
contentious and highly politizised issues that has to be
solved if agreements are to be fostered with such
groups. Fishing communities are internally differen-
tiated, not homogenous, discrete units as is often 
assumed (R. Hasler and M. Sowman, University of
Cape Town, pers. comm.), which leads to differences in
interest in terms of representation. In addition to
these issues, co-management is not only about new
institutions, but fundamentally about the new relation-


















Fig. 1: Spectrum of co-management arrangements (adapted from Sen and Raakjær Nielsen 1996, and used
to classify examples presented in Table I)
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ships which result from implementing such arrange-
ments (Pinkerton 1989a). As a result, the success of
co-management is predicated upon social learning,
and it is naive to think of co-management as a quick-
fix solution. Along with it being a time-consuming
process, there can be extra costs associated with 
attempting to obtain full representation (Jentoft
1989). Aside from these negative aspects, Jentoft and
Mikalsen (1994) state that the merits of co-management
are that greater participation by user groups in decision-
making enriches the regulatory process by proving a
broader base of information. Inclusion of the users in
the decision-making process increases the legitimacy
of the regulations. Increased legitimacy results in 
enhanced adherence to rules and regulations, which
contributes to a more efficient management system
(Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994).
International experiences
Experiences with the concept of co-management
in different countries vary widely. Countries such as
Australia have included co-management formerly
within their legislation (e.g. the State of Victoria, Fish-
eries Act No. 92 of 1995). Others, such as Canada,
Norway and the USA, apply the concept but do not
explicitly state so. Table I lists a number of documented
examples of co-management, ranked according to the
type of arrangement depicted schematically in Figure
1. Also included in Table I is an indication of the
geopolitical scale of the institution.
Examples of co-management experiences are 
diverse, but they do represent cooperative approaches
(Jentoft and McCay 1995). Although the examples
are specific, few countries represented in Table I 
employ just one model consistently for all fisheries,
sectors and regions (as is reflected in the replication
of countries). Rather, the nations surveyed have a
mixture of institutions with a varying degree of user
involvement and responsibility (see Jentoft and McCay
1995), depending on the scale of the fishery. This is the
case in Norway, which has practiced co-management
in the fisheries sector for many years (McCay and
Acheson 1987, Jentoft 1989, Pinkerton 1989a,
McGoodwin 1990, Hersoug and Rånes 1996). Regu-
latory councils on both regional and national levels
place user groups in positions within the fisheries
management decision-making process. A diverse
mixture of institutions is also found in the USA, where
user participation in fisheries management is practiced
within the regional Fisheries Management Councils.
Beyond the mandated participation by representatives
of state and federal agencies, the councils include
commercial and recreational fishermen, consumers,
processors and members of the public (Jentoft 1989).
There is user participation at other levels in the USA,
such as in the management of the Great Lakes fisheries
and the co-operative management between Indian
Treaty Tribes, the state and federal government agen-
cies in the Pacific Northwest (Anon. 1995a).
This variety of institutional arrangements can be
explained by the fact that fisheries management systems
seldom result from an intended design. Instead, they
evolve gradually, through processes of “muddling
through” and often as ad hoc responses to crises
(Jentoft and McCay 1995). This is the situation in
Pacific Canada, where the Supreme Court affirmed
the rights of First Nations to a priority allocation of
fish in 1990. In this context, the federal government
adopted a seven-year Aboriginal Fishing Strategy
(AFS) in June 1992 (McDaniels et al. 1994). Com-
ponents of the strategy included negotiated agree-
ments between the Government of Canada and abo-
riginal groups on cooperative management projects
(McDaniels et al. 1994). In all, 80 agreements under
this strategy were negotiated in 1992/93. 
Jentoft and McCay (1995) state that the specific
models in each country reflect the broader institutional
patterns and practices that prevail. Their argument is
that fisheries management institutions do not originate
in an institutional vacuum and must generally relate
to their external political environment. This factor is
evident in Canada, where the fisheries management
system has had to conform to a more participatory
form of governance. In recent years, the Canadian
government has attempted to increase user participa-
tion in the fisheries-management policy process.
User groups were originally consulted about their
concerns, but decisions were made by the fisheries
minister, whereas more recently in Atlantic Canada,
co-management arrangements have been implemented
such that industry is involved in making decisions
about allocation, monitoring and enforcement (Jentoft
and McCay 1995). 
Involving interest groups or stakeholders in the de-
cision-making process is not simply a question of
representation, but also one of scale of involvement
and level of participation of user groups. Jentoft and
McCay (1995) state that co-management implies 
delegation of authority rather than decentralization,
and that certain tasks lend themselves to the latter. For
example, in the United Kingdom, producer organiza-
tions are also actively involved in fisheries management.
They are allocated “sectoral” quotas to distribute and
administer among their members (Jentoft 1989). Pro-
ponents of decentralization argue that, if a federal
system of user-group organizations is in place, the
role of government in fisheries management could be
reduced. However, if that is not the case, then the
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government would have to make up for the structures
not in place (Jentoft 1989). In many cases, before
user groups were effectively involved they had to be
organized not only at local level, but also at regional
and national level. This was the experience in the
Philippines with community-based coastal resource
management, where community organization was a
large component of the effort to establish co-manage-
ment arrangements with local government authorities
(Pomeroy and Carlos 1997).
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have
played a key role in the implementation of manage-
ment initiatives, particularly in many co-management
projects in Africa. User groups are often poorly orga-
nized, or else their organizations are incapable of ex-
ercising management responsibility (Jentoft 1989).
Therefore, Jentoft (1989) suggests that the process of
involving user groups in fisheries management should
start with organizational development rather than
delegation or decentralization. Community-based 
development is on the agenda of international NGOs
and there are a growing number of cases of co-manage-
ment arrangements which have involved third-party
NGOs significantly in collaboration with the respon-
sible government departments and community orga-
nizations. This has been the case in management of
Lake Nokoue, Benin (Atti-Mama 1997), the fisheries
in Luapula Province in Zambia (Kafumbe 1997) and
the Lake Kariba fisheries in Zambia and Zimbabwe
(Hachongela et al. 1997). The main characteristic of
these cases is the large investment in the capacity
building crucial to initiating the process. International
NGOs traditionally cover the high costs associated
with the establishment of such arrangements in countries
where economic conditions would otherwise inhibit
such practices. Alternatively, the cost is borne by donors
who finance the fisheries programmes and support
the implementation of co-management schemes, as
in the management of the beach-seine fisheries in
Moçambique (Lopes et al. 1997). In the following
paragraphs, a diagnostic approach is presented where
the objective is to consider key factors for the creation
of successful co-management arrangements.
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF
CO-MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS
A set of attributes for co-operative management
systems is postulated as being a key factor in the 
successful establishment of such arrangements. Ex-
amples which are recognized as being either 
successful or unsuccessful are evaluated in terms of
which postulated attributes were present or absent.
This is a methodological exploration, which potentially
could be expanded. Unfortunately, the definition of
“successful” is problematic because the establishment
of arrangements is a process. Pinkerton (1989a,
1994b) herself considered it more important to define
success in terms of the process, although it should be
defined in terms of evidence of sustainability of a
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Table II: Attributes employed in preliminary analysis of co-management arrangements, in this study and Ostrom’s (1990)
list of design principles for common pool resources. Acronyms listed in Table III are defined
Attributes used in this study Ostrom’s (1990) design principles
01. Resource boundaries defined (BD)
02. Membership and participation defined (CM)
03. Rules for allocation of costs and benefits (RA)
04. All-party management board/committee (MB)
05. Management plans and reciprocal obligations (MP)
06. Enabling legislation defining control (EL)
07. Mutually agreed upon enforcement mechanism (ES)
08. Process for dispute resolution (DR)
09. Information-sharing between participants (IS)
10. Federal structure in complex cases (FS)
1. User group and resource have defined boundaries
2. User rules are appropriate for local conditions
3. Users have rights to organize independently
4. Users participate in rule modification
5. Users monitor compliance
6. Users participate in sanctioning
7. Access to low-cost conflict-resolution mechanisms
8. In complex cases the system is organized in a federal structure of
nested layers
fishery. The postulated attributes (Table II) are com-
piled from the work of Ostrom (1990) and Pinkerton
(1993). Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for the 
establishment of successful collective management
arrangements are also presented in Table II for com-
parison, and because these principles were incorpo-
rated into the attributes. Naturally, adaptations have
been made to Pinkerton’s (1993) key factors because
they are relevant to Government-First Nation salmon
management agreements in British Columbia, Canada.
The first three attributes appear to be critical for
the establishment of successful co-management 
arrangements (see Tables II and III). The reason that
these three are deemed crucial is because they frame
the patterns of interaction between the users of a
common pool resource and the responsible govern-
ment authorities, with regard to rights and rules, so
forming the foundation of institutional arrangements.
In the preliminary analysis (see Table III) this is 
evident, because the examples considered unsuccessful
have institutional arrangements that lack one of the
first three attributes listed in Table II. It is recognized
that further studies are needed to validate such a
method of analysis.
The three critical factors for the establishment of
successful management arrangements are
• defining clear boundaries for the resource;
• defining the criteria for participation in the fishery
and management;
• establishing rules for the allocation of costs and
benefits between the participants.
The other attributes (4–10 in Table II), which are
important but not crucial, include involving represen-
tatives of participants within formal structures such
as management boards that establish management
plans, creating dispute-resolution mechanisms, facili-
tating information sharing, and establishing 
enabling legislation and negotiated enforcement
mechanisms. These attributes are key to the success of
the arrangements as cumulative elements, as presented
in Pinkerton’s (1994b) analysis. That is, the more 
attributes (of Types 4–10 in Table II) present, the
more likely the project will be successful. Most of
these attributes in one way or another reflect capacity,
that is the user group’s capability of being involved
in management.
In the example from the Skeena River (British
Columbia, Canada, Table III), one of the key attributes
which was not established was the lack of clearly 
defined rules for membership (attribute CM). The
process of establishing multiparty co-management
processes to save steelhead stocks have been unsuc-
cessful. Anybody can buy a licence to fish recrea-
tionally and one could therefore postulate that, until






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a limited licence scheme is in place with members
accepting the rules, sector conflict will continue.
This generalization is applicable to any multisector
fishery with recreation as one of the sectors, although
it is difficult to imagine how the public would accept
a limited entry system for recreational fisheries. Ex-
amples from other fisheries are also presented in
Table III in order to present the diversity of institu-
tional arrangements. Further analyses would require
a larger sample from the case studies that exist.
Japanese coastal fishing community cooperatives are
considered successful and, in the case of the analysis,
every attribute exists. However, the apparent success
of these arrangements can be related to the inherent
culture of collectivism in Japan, and therefore this
analysis should be evaluated in terms of its general
predictive capabilities. This fact must be taken into
consideration when suggesting rules for the establish-
ment of co-management arrangements in South Africa.
Even if attempts are made to establish co-management
arrangements where all the attributes are present, the
project may not necessarily result in success. A culture
specific situation, such as the history of inequity in
resource allocation, could derail the process. How-
ever, as a preliminary analysis it does present critical
factors for the successful establishment of cooperative
management systems.
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT POLICY IN
SOUTH AFRICA
In the past decade South Africa has gone through
major political change with the introduction of multi-
party participatory democracy (Giliomee 1995). The
first all-party elections took place in April 1994 and
now many policies of the new government are aimed
at addressing inequalities of the past (Hatchard and
Slinn 1995). Key objectives of the government with
regard to fisheries include decreasing unemployment,
promoting sustainable use, earning foreign exchange,
increasing economic efficiency, increasing equity in
the distribution of benefits, and increasing user 
participation in management (Hutton et al. 1997,
Cochrane and Payne 1998). Hutton and Lamberth (in
press) review the possibilities and constraints of in-
cluding users at the community level in management
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Fig. 2: The locations of Arniston, Hawston, the Olifants River harder fishery and the Mapelane Nature Reserve
within South Africa
of the linefishery at Arniston on South Africa’s south
coast (Fig. 2). Hersoug (1996) reviewed the policy-
development process and made reference to the inclusion
of users in the management of marine resources.
South Africa has an array of fisheries that include
commercial, recreational and subsistence sectors,
with more than 26 000 people being employed in the
formal commercial sector alone. Commercial catches
are dominated by those of the demersal and pelagic
fisheries, which together accounted for 88–95% of
the reported catch for the period 1975–1991 (Chief
Directorate Sea Fisheries 1993). Payne and Crawford
(1989) reviewed the major fisheries in South Africa
and reviews of the fisheries management process are
given by, among others, Bergh and Barkai (1993),
Anon. (1995b), Cochrane (1995) and Cochrane and
Payne (1998). Since 1948, a series of Sea Fishery Acts
and amendments have limited entry by imposing
controls and restrictions on fishing, including licensing,
permit requirements and quota allocations. The central
government has played the major role in assuming
responsibility for management of marine resources.
At present, the Department of Environmental Affairs
and Tourism administers government policy through
the Sea Fishery Act (1988). 
The Minister is required to appoint a Sea Fishery
Advisory Committee (SFAC) and an independent
Quota Board (the latter to allocate quotas), and has
the responsibility to grant and terminate rights of 
exploitation. The Minister also sets the Total Allowable
Catch (TAC) for the quota species. The SFAC 
currently has 11 members, appointed by the minister
for their personal expertise, to advise him/her. The
day-to-day decision-making of the responsible parties
at central government level is reflected in Figure 3.
The government has delegated a few responsibilities
to the provinces, especially to KwaZulu-Natal, which
administers enforcement and licensing of local stocks
through the Natal Nature Conservation Ordinance
(No. 15 of 1974). However, the management of marine
resources in South Africa remains the principle 
responsibility of the central government.
Sea Fisheries (SF) has established scientific working
groups, which also include independent and non-State
scientists, to determine the scientific basis for manage-
ment strategies. Recommendations from all these and
other sources are directed to the SFAC and ultimately
the Minister. In South Africa, the elements of user
participation fall short of the government sharing
management responsibility (i.e. through the presence
of joint decision-making structures). However, in
terms of the Sea Fishery Act, the Minister may recog-
nize any industrial body or interest group. These
have the power to advise and make recommendations
either to the SFAC or the Minister. Table IV lists the
interest groups or industrial bodies recognized under
the Act. This recognition has resulted in organiza-
tions such as the South East Coast Inshore Fishing
Association (SECIFA) playing an active role in the
management of the inshore trawl fishery in partnership
with the government. Formal liaison between these
organizations, other stakeholders and the research
component is through so-called INSEFs (Industry –
Sea Fisheries Forum) established at the discretion of
the Director of Sea Fisheries (Fig. 3).
In the past, structures such as Sea Management
Committees have also been created to exchange inform-
ation and have facilitated consultation. However, not
all decisions were made purely by government agencies
and, on many occasions, established industry had an
input greater than mere consultation (though generally
falling within the definition consultative in Fig. 1).
The major fisheries sectors have found the manage-
ment liaison committees to be ideal interfaces for
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Table IV: Interest groups or industrial bodies recognized in terms of the Sea Fishery Act (1988), as of 23 October 1992
(Source: Government Gazette No. 4967)
Organization Principle fishery
Interest groups
South African Marine Linefish Management Association Linefish
False Bay Trek Fishermen’s Association Beach-seine fishing
Mariculture Association of Southern Africa Mariculture
Industrial bodies
South African Deepsea Trawling Industry Association Hake demersal trawl fishery
Abalone Sea Management Association Abalone
South African Seaweed Concessionaires Association Seaweed
South East Coast Inshore Fishing Association South Coast inshore trawl
South African Frozen Rock Lobster Packers (Pty) Ltd West Coast rock lobster
South African Squid Management Industrial Association Squid 
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MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND
TOURISM
Ultimate policy - maker
DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS
CHIEF DIRECTORATE : SEA FISHERIES


























Fig. 3: Organogram of structures emanating from the Sea Fishery Act of 1988 to manage the marine resources of South Africa
(adapted from Chief Directorate Sea Fisheries 1993)
policy, commerce and science (Bross 1987), but have
expanded them during the past decade to include the
INSEFs mentioned above. As key principles are 
extracted from these experiences, there is a possibility
that these local associations will adapt to suit the new
policy environment. In summary, co-management
is not a new concept in South Africa and was prac-
ticed by the government before 1994. However, those
processes and structures are not necessarily 
accepted as legitimate by those disadvantaged in the
past.
Including other types of user groups such as fishing
communities directly in resource management was
never attempted on a large scale. Defining such groups
is often problematic. This became evident in the
early 1990s, when the government experimented
with the Fishermens Community Trust System. 
Although communities were not given the opportunity
to catch their own fish, they were responsible for
“managing” the distribution of the benefits after
being allocated a share of the TAC, a function reflecting
the tasks they would perform if delegated responsi-
bility for management of marine resources and the
distribution of the benefits thereof. The problem of
identifying beneficiaries in the communities led to
conflict, and the Supreme Court decided in 1995 to
terminate the system. This case highlights the problems
that can manifest when attempts are made to involve
users at the scale of communities in management 
responsibility.
USER PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
In October 1994, a national fisheries management
policy-development process was initiated, with 
extensive consultation and stakeholder participation
in the formulation of a draft policy. The Fisheries
Policy Development Committee (FPDC) was set up
by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism, with the mandate to ensure participation at
all levels. The committee consisted, inter alia, of
representatives from industry, the coastal provinces
(governments and regional fora), the central government,
labour, the environmental sector, the recreational sec-
tor and the “informal sector”. Regional fishing fora
represented fisheries interest groups at “grassroots”
level (Cochrane and Payne 1998). 
Within the draft fisheries policy document were
specific clauses implying that management authority
could, under certain circumstances, be delegated to
lower levels. In addition, the clause that deals with
user participation addressed guidelines for participation
at all levels. Also, there was a clause which dealt
with user participation in management plans. More-
over, in the section that discussed levels of management
and institutional structure, reference was made to the 
delegation of management responsibility. Lastly, the
potential role of the fishing fora and how they could
gain access to decision-making was dealt with in the
section on structures and institutions. That process
was completed in June 1996 when the draft policy
was submitted to the Minister. However, several
problems remained unresolved. Consequently, exten-
sive redrafting then took place by the department and
its advisers, culminating in May 1997 in the release
of a White Paper “A Marine Fisheries Policy for
South Africa, Anon. 1997). In that document, efficient
consultation is presented as an option (because of
concerns with legitimacy), but clauses are included
which stipulate the need to minimize costs and 
bureaucracy in terms of user-group participation in
management (Anon. 1997). This is one of the reasons
that the White Paper reaffirms the government’s will
to control fisheries at a national level. Co-management
is recognized as a potential option for special attention,
but only in the case of non-mobile marine resources
which are nearshore and do not overlap provincial
boundaries. The practicality of multiparty co-
management arrangements for shared resources 
appears to be outside the realm of government policy
in the White Paper, probably as a result of the need
to meet the objective of minimizing bureaucracy,
something not highlighted in the FPDC document.
There is a willingness to facilitate consultation 
between government and fishing fora, but only if
they are self-generative and self-supported (Anon.
1997).
Local initiatives and research in South Africa
Although several authors and studies have made
reference to the relevance of the concept of co-
management in South Africa (Anon. 1996, Hutton et
al. 1997, Cochrane and Payne 1998), very few 
attempts have been made to apply the concept to
management of fisheries resources at local levels
(e.g. Beaumont and Wynberg 1996, Harris et al.
1996, Sowman et al. 1996). More recently (June
1997), a workshop was held to establish a national
programme on coastal and fisheries co-management,
and there are attempts to coordinate the development
and implementation of projects. Some preliminary
results have been obtained from case studies such as
the Western Cape Olifants River fishery for mullet or
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harder (Mugilidae) and from experiences in the
Mapelane Nature Reserve (KwaZulu-Natal, see Fig.
2). Sowman et al. (1996), in a review of co-manage-
ment in the Olifants River harder fishery, noted that
the project has strengthened relations between the re-
sponsible government agencies and the fishing com-
munity and so facilitated both conservation and de-
velopment. 
Elsewhere in the Western Cape, there have been
other initiatives, such as a proposal for an abalone
Haliotis midae re-seeding project in Hawston which
would involve all stakeholders (Fig. 2, Hauck and
Sweijd 1997). One of the most comprehensive projects
has been undertaken in KwaZulu-Natal to address
the illegal, unsustainable subsistence use of intertidal
mussels (Harris et al. 1996). A Joint Mussel Manage-
ment Committee was established with representatives
from the Sokhulu community, the KwaZulu-Natal
Nature Conservation Service (KZNNCS) marine 
reserve officials and researchers (KZNNCS and Uni-
versity of Cape Town). The need for training to en-
able all players to participate fully in the process was
deemed essential to the long-term success of 
the project (Harris et al. 1996). The last authors
found that meaningful participation by the Sokhulu 
community in management and decision-making 
requires that they have the information, skills and
confidence to voice their needs and to challenge 
proposals. Within the project, training is taking the form
of workshops on committee structure and functioning,
literacy training and basic environmental education
(Harris et al. 1996). Therefore, development of capa-
city within communities and their local organizations
is critical to the process, as identified in the interna-
tional experiences. 
The above two case studies are included in Table III
as part of the preliminary analysis, and both possess the
essential first three attributes. That is, the boundaries
of the resource are well defined, there are criteria 
for membership and the rules for the distribution of
benefits are established. One would like to predict
that these arrangements will be successful, but it is
still too early for their thorough evaluation.
Constraints to greater user involvement in manage-
ment
The potential for user-group involvement in
management could be harnessed in various forms,
such as government arrangements with single parties
for example a community fishing a local resource or
an association of industries fishing a stock with a
common gear. Alternatively, in the case of shared re-
sources that are widely dispersed, the government
could enter into multiple agreements with all the user
groups (be they fishing communities or fishing orga-
nizations or associations) under the umbrella of multi-
party co-management arrangements. The role of 
industry associations is well established and they will
continue to be involved in many aspects of 
marine resource management. However, including
user groups of the form of fishing communities is
often problematic. Communities are rarely homogenous
and the word is often used as a political term to 
designate a following for political action and an 
audience for political rhetoric (Thornton and Ramphele
1988). There can be no guarantee that a community
actually exists. There may in fact be no willingness
to cooperate and no coherent social organization.
Scott (1993) states that it is this heterogeneity that
prevents people from cooperating, especially when
they disagree over fishing rights. Within fisheries
there is a general perception of unfair distribution of
access rights, a mistrust of authority and lack of faith
in government control, within certain sectors of the
population. If co-management agreements are going
to involve joint decision-making, they will have to
deal with both the exploitation of the resource and its
distribution. It is therefore critical that the allocation
of resources (i.e. access rights), a political issue and
not a technical one, be dealt with as soon as possible. 
Within South Africa, any strategies that are aimed
at inclusion must be sensitive to the historical, political,
social and economic factors which continue to 
influence target communities (F. Khan, Environ-
mental Evaluation Unit, University of Cape Town,
pers. comm.). Given the disparities in access to decision-
making structures, there is a need to provide dis-
advantaged users/stakeholders with some intervention
strategies to empower them where disparity has been
exacerbated by the past political situation (Fowkes
1996). The last author states that the level of user
rights in decisions should be negotiated in order to
facilitate sustainability. However, within communities
there are economic and social legacies, such as
poverty and illiteracy, which constrain community
involvement in decision-making. Also there has been
considerable uncertainty as to the role of previous
local government structures and an apparent general
unwillingness on the part of government agencies to
devolve power, citing scepticism that other levels of
governance can accept responsibility and be account-
able for management of local resources. Establishing
local organizations with legitimate representation
that government agencies will recognize is therefore
a key stumbling block to facilitating arrangements
with greater user participation in management.
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Opportunities for participation in management
arrangements
Overall, the impetus for greater user involvement
in marine resource management in South Africa does
exist, because the country has a new constitutional
dispensation based on participatory democracy.
Jentoft and McCay (1995) argue that the fisheries
management system will come to reflect the overall
political framework and ideology in a country. One
of the key questions is whether participation will end
up being more apparent than real, as Felt (1990) 
argues is the case in Atlantic Canada. However, the
government policies in South Africa truly aim to be
transparent and inclusive in encouraging public parti-
cipation. There is a national will to make participatory
democracy work, and numerous examples exist of
negotiated settlements, using the ideals of consensus,
compromise and debate. Therefore, the socio-political
environment really does exist to embrace concepts
such as co-management within South African fish-
eries management policy.
SUMMARY
• Co-management can generally be defined as shared
decision-making between government agencies
and user-group representative structures. 
• International experiences reflect the diversity of
political systems and, in most countries, mixtures
of institutions with a varying degree of user in-
volvement exist. In fisheries which are of regional
importance, regulatory councils allow user-group
representatives consultative positions. Alternatively,
examples exist where arrangements are established
between government agencies and communities,
when the resources are locally based. The practices
tend to reflect the broader institutional patterns in
each country.
• Preliminary analysis of co-management arrange-
ments points to key attributes which need to be
considered if successful systems are to be established.
The definition of boundaries (resource and human)
and the rules for participation and the allocation of
costs and benefits need to be well established.
• The relevance of co-management needs to be eva-
luated in South Africa. It is not a new concept and
there continues to be industry-government inter-
action, although it is recognized that this has been
mostly of a consultative nature with industry asso-
ciations. Involving users at other levels (e.g. com-
munities) in the decision-making process is often a
question of representation, and user groups are often
poorly organized and not capable of exercising
management responsibilities. 
• The process should begin with the development of
locally based organizations rather than delegation
or decentralization, but the costs can prohibit
government action. This is the case in many of the
African examples considered where NGOs have
been extensively involved in the implementation of
projects.
• In South Africa it is likely that greater user partici-
pation in management will be a key part of future
fisheries management. Not only does the broad
policy environment support it, but there are also
good examples where it is currently being applied.
The most obvious challenge to the success of this
policy is the controversial issue of access rights
and the lack of capacity within user groups such as
fishing communities. 
• The impetus for user involvement exists in the
form of a new constitutional dispensation of parti-
cipatory democracy. If the fisheries management
system comes to reflect the overall political frame-
work in the country, then some form of user parti-
cipation in management is inevitable.
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